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IMMIGRATION TO BLUE CITIES IN RED STATES: THE
BATTLEGROUND BETWEEN SANCTUARY AND EXCLUSION

KarlaMan McKanders*
ABSTRACT
An ongoing intrastate immigration regulation battle between cities, munic palities, and states with the Trump
Administration intervening enth litigation and executive orders has dominated the immigration federalism
landscape. Some states, cities, and localities have passedsancluary laws andpolicies
seeking to protect immngrant
communities by notinquiring into an individuals imigation status, while other states have begun to pass
exclusionary anti-sanclay laws, sanctioning non-compliance ith
federal immigration laws.
The Trump Administration'spolicies, along weith
the resulting litigation,place inmigrationfederalism in an
unprecedentedcontext. This Symposium Article interrogates the concept ofirmnigrationfederalismexamining the
political and ideologicalcontours of state and local exclusionary and sanctuary laws highlighting new issues that
have surfaced under the TrumpAdministration'spolicies. This Article utilizes the red state and blue city intrastae
federalism conflicts within the State of Tennessee to highlight the political dynamics that govern
the passing of
state anl local excl onany and sanctuay laws. The new landscape of exclusionary and sanctuary laws has
increasingly emphasized a red state and blue city
political divide. In this contex4 this Article argues that recent
immigrationfederalism standoffs center aroundpolitical divisions which fail to engage in principled evaluations
of which level of.government federa state, or local- should be the locus f immigration regulation.
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INTRODUCTION

The January 2018 Symposium topic is particularly relevant: Executive
Power: Immigration Reform in the New Administration focusing on Sanctuay Cities:
State and Federal Standoffs. Since 2006, there has been an ongoing battle
between cities, municipalities, states, and the federal government over
immigration regulation. In this setting, states and cities have passed both
sanctuary and exclusionary immigration laws. The push for state and local
immigration laws began with conservative legislative groups like the
American Legislative Exchange Council drafting and promoting subfederal
legislatures to enact exclusionary anti-immigrant laws,' whereas Sanctuary
laws and policies seek to protect immigrant communities by not inquiring
into an individual's immigration status when providing state or local services
including law enforcement. The intent is to create a safe space for
immigrants. The concept of sanctuary has evolved in the United States to
signify a moral and ethical obligation to protect migrants from unjust
2
removal from the United States.
This commentary interrogates the concept of immigration federalism,
examining the political and ideological contours of state and local sanctuary
laws in the context of both state and the Trump Administration's
exclusionary policies. I utilize the intrastate federalism conflicts within the
State of Tennessee to highlight the political dynamics that govern the passing
of state and local sanctuary laws analyzing new issues that have surfaced
under the Trump Administration. In this context, the commentary argues
that recent immigration federalism standoffs center around political divisions
which fail to engage in principled evaluations of which level of governmentfederal, state, or local--should be the locus of immigration regulation.

I

2

See NANCY MACLEAN, DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS: THE DEEP HiSTORY OF THE RADICAL RIGHT'S
STEALTH PLAN FOR AMERICA xix (2017) ("'Whatwe've witness,' he [William Cronon] said, is part
of a 'well-planned and well-coordinated national campaign.' (italics added). Presciently, he
suggested that others look into the funding and activities of a then little-known organization that
referred to itself as the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and kept its elected
members to a secret from outsiders. It was producing hundreds of 'model laws' each year for
Republican legislators to bring home to enact in their states--and nearly 30 percent were going
through. Alongside laws to devastate labor unions were others that would rewrite tax codes, undo
environmental protections, privatize many public resources, and require police to take action
against undocumented immigrants?"); seealso Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! "Illegal"
Immigrants Beware: Local JointigrationOrdinancesand What the FederalGoverwnt Must Do A bout It, 39 LOY.
U. CHI. LJ. 1, 48 49 (2007) (citing California legislature promoting the passing of Save Our State
anti-immigrant laws across the country).
See Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a "Sanctuary," 61 S.M.U. L. REV. 133, 135 (2008) (stating that
"the use of the word sanctuary conveyed a sense of moral and ethical obligation that churches and,
to some extent, the local governments aimed to evoke").
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Immigration scholarship has extensively examined the federalism
implications of past and recent state and local laws. 3 Recent immigration
federalism scholarship has analyzed how Congress's devolution of
immigration power to states has provided space for progressive state
legislatures to substantially affect immigration law; as well as state and local
5
push back against the Trump Administration's immigration policies.
My previous scholarship addressing immigration federalism was framed
based upon immigration being under the exclusive authority of the federal
government. 6 My previous articles posited that "[fiederalism principles may
be employed to simplify the system and safeguard immigrants' rights." 7
The Trump Administration's policies, along with the resulting litigation,
place immigration federalism in an unprecedented context.
This
commentary examines this new context. Part I examines the contours the
Trump Administration's unprecedented immigration policies, executive
actions, and the resulting impact on immigration federalism.
Part II

6

See,e.g., Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV.
787, 798 (2008) (discussing the blurring line between national and state governments with respect
to immigration laws); Karla Mari McKanders, Federal Preemption and Immgrants' Rights, 3 WAKE
FOREST.J.L. & POL'Y 333, 334 (2013) (examining the relationship between federal and local laws
through the lens of Arizona's Senate Bill 1070); Karla Mari McKanders, UnJorgimng of Those Who
TrespassAgainstUS.: SlateLaws CriminalizingmmgrationStatus, 12 LoY.J. PUB. INT. L. 331, 334, 345
52 (2011) (arguing the Immigration and Nationality Act precludes states from enacting immigration
laws under the federal preemption doctrine); Karla Mari McKanders, Sustaining Tiered Personhood:
Jim Crow and Anti-Inwmtgrant Laws, 26 HARV.J. ON RACIAL & ETHNICJUST. 163, 169 70 (2010)
(theorizing that state and local anti-immigrant laws led to the segregation, exclusion, and
degradation ofLatinos from American society in the same way thatJim Crow laws excluded African
Americans from membership in social, political, and economic institutions within the United States
and relegated them to second-class citizenship status); Karla Mari McKanders, The Constitutionality
ofState and Local Laws Tagetinglrnmigrants,31 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV. 579, 590 91, 599 600
(2009) (discussing preemption of state and local immigration laws under Supreme Court precedent);
McKanders, supra note 1, at 48 49 (arguing that Congress must begin to explicitly preempt state
immigration laws); Huyen Pham, The ConstitutionalRight.Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal
Intiogration Power, 74 U. CfN. L. REV. 1373, 1376-77 (2006) (discussing whether the federal
government may require state governments to cooperate in enforcement ofimmigration laws under
the federal preemption doctrine); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significarice of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 620 26 (2008) (discussing federal preemption and state
immigration regulation); L. Darnell Weeden, Local Laws Restricting the Freedom of Undocumented
Inmigrants as Violations of Equal Protection and PrinciplesofFederal Preemption, 52 ST. LOUIS U. Lj. 479,
491-97 (2008) (explaining that the power to regulate immigration has historically and
constitutionally been entrusted to the federal government).
See Leticia M. Saucedo, States of Desire:How Immigration Law Allows States to Attract DesiredImmigrants,
52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 476 (2018) (focusing on how states have achieved integrationist, preimmigration aims rather than restricting immigration in light of emerging immigration federalism).
See Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanifng "Sanctuary Cities," 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703, 1708 (2018)
(detailing the efforts of local politicians to enact "sanctuary" policies and denounce the Trump
Administration's deportation efforts).
McKanders, The Constitutionaliy fState and Local Laws Targeting Immigrants, supra note 3, at 590-9 1;

7

McKanders, supra note 1, at 48 49; see also Karla Mari McKanders, Sustaining 7-red Personhsod:fim
Crow and Anti-Innigrant Laws, 26 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163, 169--70 (2010)
(summarizing preVious articles, which analyzed immigration as a federally preempted area of law).
McKanders, supra note 1, at 40.

3

4

5
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examines state and local resistance to the Trump Administration's policies
specifically examining recent sanctuary and anti-sanctuary state and local
immigration laws. This Part utilizes the example of the intrastate conflicts in
Tennessee to understand the contours of intrastate immigration and the
Trump Administration's federalism battle. Part III examines the resulting
litigation between the Trump Administration and sub-federal governments.
The commentary concludes with an analysis of what the future holds for
immigration federalism.

I. IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM AND THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
The Trump Administration has taken unprecedented unilateral
executive actions to regulate immigration. The Administration's unilateral
actions have bypassed Congress; reinterpreted longstanding provisions of the
Immigration and Nationality Act; and attempted to overturn longstanding
Board of Immigration Appeals and federal court precedent. To justify the
changes, the Administration has employed the doctrines of sovereignty and
national security, which underlie the executive branch's authority over
immigration.
The federal government's authority over immigration is derived from
multiple places. While there is no specific provision in the Constitution that
gives the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over immigration,
Article I,Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution provides that Congress shall
create a uniform rule of naturalization.8 Pursuant to this clause, Congress
enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (the "INA").9
The Trump Administration has relied on the plenary powers doctrine to
support its broad non-legislative changes to immigration law. The plenary
powers doctrine was first articulated in the 1889 Supreme Court case, Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, which challenged the Chinese Exclusion Act.10 In
Chae Chan Ping, the Supreme Court upheld the Exclusion Act, even though it
contained a discriminatory animus in deference to the federal government's
sweeping powers over immigration."

8

U.S. CONST.art. I, § 8, cl.4.

9

Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended

at8U.S.C.§§ 1101, 1151 1157, 1181 1182, 1201, 1254 1255, 1259, 1322, 1351 (2012)).
10

Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).

1i

Id. at 603 04 (laying out the plenary powers doctrine which attributed the power as inherent to a
sovereign nation); seeFiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) ("[Olver no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete than over the admission of aliens." (quoting Oceanic
Steam Naxigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909))); Chris Nwachukwu Okeke &James
A.R. Nafzinger, United States Migration Law: Essentialsfor Comparison, 54 A,4.J. COMP. L. 531, 544
(2006) (stating that "[a] cardinal doctrine of United States constitutional law is that Congress has
an inherent, plenary power in matters of immigration"); Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Love with
Immigralion Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1630 (1997) ("[The federal government has enjoyed
a virtual carte blanche on inmmigration matters.").
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The plenary powers doctrine is derived from a sovereign's inherent
authority to regulate migration and exclude migrants from its borders. 12 The
Supreme Court has held that the federal government's power to control
immigration is inherent in the nation's sovereignty. 13
As a corollary to sovereignty, the Trump Administration has also invoked
national security as a grounds for its broad authority to regulate
immigration. 4 In the recent Supreme Court case, Trump v. Hawaii,the Court
refused to examine the President's discriminatory animus as a motivation for
the travel ban where he invoked national security as a grounds for instituting
a ban on the immigration of individuals from Muslim majority countries.15
The invocation of sovereignty and national security has permitted the
Administration to institute sweeping reforms, including the 2017 travel
ban, 16 the attempt to change the procedures for applying for asylum, 17 and,
most relevant to this Article, the attempt to curtail the ways in which states
and localities regulate immigrants within their jurisdiction.
In response to the Trump Administration's immigration policies, several
states and localities have passed sanctuary laws, resolutions, and policies.18
In passing sanctuary laws, states have relied upon their Tenth Amendment
police powers to exercise control over the health, safety, and welfare of
individuals including immigrants within their jurisdiction. 19

12
13

See BAS SCHOTEL, ON THE RIGHT OF EXCLUSION: LAW, ETHICS, AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 14
(2012) (defining exclusion in the migratory context through the lens of exclusion of goods).
See Fiau, 430 U.S. at 792 ("Our cases have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as

14
15
16

a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments ......
(internal quotation marks omitted)); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp.
755, 768 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892))
(recognizing the inherent power ofa sovereign nation to control its borders); see also Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) ("Drawing upon [its Article I, Section 8] power, upon its plenary authority
with respect to foreign relations and international commerce, and upon the inherent power of a
sovereign to close its borders, Congress has developed a complex scheme governing admission to
our Nation and status within our borders."). See generalIy Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698 (1893) (pointing out that the Constitution vests the national government with absolute control
over international relations); Chae Chans Ping, 130 U.S. at 581 (stating that the government's power
to exclude aliens from the United States is not open to controversy).
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2405 (2018).
Id. at 2421.
Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Viar. 6, 2017).

17
18

19

Aliens Subject to Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential Proclamations, Procedures for
Protection Claims, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,934 (Nov. 9, 2018) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(3)).
Tim Henderson, Cities, Stlates Resist and Assist Inmmgration Crackdown sn .New Ways, PEW
CHARITABLE TR.: STATELINE (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2018/08/03/cities-states-resist-and-assist-immigration-crackdown-innew-ways.
See Laurel R. Boatright, Note, "Clear Eye for the State Guy"- ClarifvingAutho ay and Trusting Federalismto
Increase Vonfederal Assistance with ImmigrationEnforcement, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1666 (2006) (stating
that even though the federal government possesses de clearest authority to enforce immigration
laws, states bear most of the costs of failed immigration policy).
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II. BLUE CITY RESISTANCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION AND RED STATE
POLICIES
A. Sanctuay as a Form of Resistance
In response to the Trump Administration's immigration policies, at the
sub-federal level, states and localities have developed ways to protect
immigrant communities. Some jurisdictions have actively sought to resist the
Trump Administration's policies by utilizing traditional sanctuary policies
while also developing policies to broadly address the impact of over policing
20
on both immigrant and black and brown communities.
Sanctuary policies have deep historical roots in protecting individuals
from the state. The term sanctuary has become deeply contested and has no
commonly accepted meaning. 2' The sanctuary, however, is rooted in the
Judeo-Christian heritage.22 hi the Old Testament of the Bible, sanctuary
was offered as a form of protection to individuals seeking protection.2 3
Between 1982 and 1992, American churches popularized the tradition of
sanctuary as a religious and political movement where approximately 500
congregations in the United States sheltered Central American refugees,
fleeing political violence from Immigration and Naturalization Service
authorities. 24 Churches were providing assistance to asylum applicants from
25
Central America.
In 2006, another sanctuary movement emerged in response to mass
deportations and an anti-undocumented immigrant sentiment across the
United States. 26 Sanctuary today still signifies a wide range of policies by
federal, state, local governmental and non-governmental organizations to
create a safe space or place for immigrant communities.2 7 "Local police
departments, for example, have adopted 'non-cooperation' or 'don't ask,

21

See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 18 (explaining the ways localities have directed officers to arrest few
individuals).
SeeLasch, supra note 5, at 1709 (2018) (noting that "[t]here is no definition of 'sanctuary' in federal

22

law and there is a wide and diverse range of activties that might qualify as a 'sanctuary." (quoting
Elizabeth M. McCormick, FederalAnti-SanctuagyLaw: A FailedApproach to Immigration Enforcement and a
Poor Substitutefor Real Reform, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 165, 169 n. 12 (2016))). See generally Virgil
Wiebe, Immigration Federalismin Minnesota: What Does Sanctuag Mlean in Practice?, 13 U. ST. THOMAS
LJ. 581 (2017) (discussing varying meanings of sanctuary as applied to the home, church, schools,
cities, and states on the federal level).
See KAREN MUSALO,JENNIFER MOORE & RICHARD A. BOSWELL, REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY:

23
24

A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACH 8 (4th ed. 2011).
See Villazor, supra note 2, at 138 12.
Karla McKanders, The SubnationalResponse: Local Inervention in Immigration Policy and Enforcement, in

25
26

COIvIPASSIONATE MIGRATION AND REGIONAL POLICY IN THE AMERICAS 33 -52 (Steven W.
Bender & William F. Arrocha eds., 2017).
Villazor, supra note 2, at 135.
Id. at 144 47.

27

Id. at 145.

20
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don't tell' policies to further public safety concerns." 28 The goal is for the
policies to facilitate immigrant communities' cooperation in reporting crimes
without fear of deportation or being reported to Immigration and Customs
Enforcement ("ICE").
The religious origins of sanctuary imply a certain level of ethics and
compassion towards individuals who are displaced from their home
countries. Contemporary uses of the word sanctuary cities and states have
increasingly developed negative meanings.2 9 Immigration scholar Rose
Villazor, states: "[the] politically motivated disapproving use of the word
sanctuary has unfairly conflated legitimate state and local policies that serve
local interests or policies that comply with the Constitution or federal laws
30
with legislation that is intended to supersede immigration law."
The term sanctuary has also been used to denote states and localities that
limit cooperation with the enforcement of federal immigration policies31
specifically the detention of immigrants for federal immigration authorities.
The most recent data from the National Conference of State Legislatures
provides that in 2017, at least twenty-five states considered sixty-six bills,
down from one-hundred last year. 32 In 2018, three states-California, Iowa,
33
and Tennessee-enacted laws related to sanctuary policies.
B. State and Local IntrastateImmigration FederalismBattles
Tennessee provides a case study to analyze sanctuary laws and policies in
the context of intrastate city and state legislature conflicts in response to the
Trump Administration's policies. From 2000-2017, Tennessee experienced
a 118.7% increase in its foreign-born population. 34 This demographic
change, coupled with the push by organizations like the American Legislative
Exchange Council's agenda to pass immigration laws, has given rise to wide
28
29
30
31

Id. at 148.
See generaly McKanders, supra note 24 (discussing the proliferation of state and local immigration
laws and the challenges they face).
Villazor, supra note 2, at 136.
What's a Sanctuaty Poliy? FA Qon Federal, Stale and LocalAction on ImmigrationEnforcement, NAT'L CONF.
ST. LEGISLATURES July 28, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigra6on/sanctuary-policyfaq635991795.aspx.

32

Id.

33

Report on State Imnigration Laws 1 2018, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, (Jan. 11, 2019),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/report-on-state-immigration-laws.aspx.
Tennessee, MIGRATION POL'Y INST., htps://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/
demographics/TN Oast visited Mar. 1, 2019); see also South Dakota Has the Fastest-Growng State Latina
PopulationSince
2000, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/09/08/
latino-popu1lation-growth-and-dispersion-has-slowed-since-the-onset-of-the-great-recession/
ph_2016-09-08-geography-24/ (finding that from 2000-2014, Tennessee experienced a 176%
change in its Latino population); Renee Stepier & Mark Hugo Lopez, Ranking the Latino Populationin
the States, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/09/08/4-rankingthe-latino-population-in-the-states/ (finding that 43% of the Latino population in Tennessee are
foreign born).

34
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variation amongst and within cities and counties in an attempt to pass
sanctuary and exclusionary policies. The variation, in some instances, has
been divided along a Republican state-Democratic city line.
Further, immigrant populations are moving to both the larger cities in
Tennessee and also the more rural areas where there are factories, tourism
(Smoky Mountains), and also farming industries. 35 Like other states,
Tennessee resembles the rest of the country politically, where Republicans
control rural and suburban areas and Democrats control urban areas. 36 The
larger cities, Memphis and Nashville, have attempted to pass sanctuary
immigration policies, to which the Republican majority Tennessee
legislature has expressed opposition. Tennessee mirrors multiple states in the
South where there is a battle between largely Republican state legislatures
and Democratic cities over sanctuary policies.
Nashville is a demographically diverse city. 37 In 201 7, Nashville's City
Council considered adopting a sanctuary city ordinance. The proposed
ordinance prohibited the county sheriff from responding to inquiries from
federal immigration agencies on immigrants in the county's custody unless a
warrant was issued. 38 Further, it only mandated cooperation when legally

35

36

37

38

See Tennevsee, NEW AM. EcON., https://www.newamericaneconomy.org/locations/tennessee/ (last
visited Mar. 1, 2019) (noting the occupations of immigrants in Tennessee ranged from agricultural
workers (in rural areas) painters, construction, maids, packers, maintenance workers); see also Lizzy
Alfs, Study: Immigrants Vital to Tennessee Economy, TENNESSEAN (Feb. 21, 2017, 2:50 P.i),
https://www.tennessean.com/story/money/2017/02/21 /study-iinmmigTants-vital-teinesseeeconomy/98200076/ ("The occupations with the largest share of foreign-born workers in
Tennessee include painters; hand packers and packagers; agricultural workers; construction
laborers; software developers; packaging and filling machine operators and tenders; food service
managers; maids and housekeepers; physicians and surgeons; and carpenters.").
See Sam Stockard, Democratic iayors Strike Delicate Balance, TENN. LEDGER, July 30, 2016, at 2, 6;
Tennessee Star Stafl, Vanderbilt Poll .Yashuille. a Blue City in a Red State; Majority of City's Residents
Disapprove of President Trump, TENN. STAR (Apr. 1, 2017), http://tennesseestar.com/2017/04/01/
vanderbilt-poll-nashville-a-blue-city-in-a-red-state-majority-of-citys-residents-disapprove-ofpresident-trump/.
See QjickFacts: Aas/aille-Davidson (Balance), Tennessee; Davidson County, Tennessee, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/taile/nashvilledaidsonbalancetennesseedavidsoncoun
tytennessee/PST0452 18 (last visited Mar. 1, 2019) (stating demographic makeup of the City of
Nashville is White alone 63.1%; Black or African American alone 27.8%; American Indian and
Alaska Native alone 0.3%; Asian alone 3.6%; Hispanic or Latino 10.4%; and White alone, not
Hispanic or Latino 55.6%); see also Mary Hance, 11 Things You Should Know About Nashville's Diversity:
Nashville Is Aore Culturally Rich Tian Io Might 7hink, TENNESSEAN (Sept. 30, 2017, 10:00 AM)
https://w ww.tennessean.com/story/life/shopping/ms-cheap/2017/09/30/1 l-things-youshould-know-nashvilles-diversity/699228001 / (last updated Oct. 2, 2017, 4:19 PM) (citing Mayor
Megan Barry's office and Nashville Culture Festival officials).
Nashville, Tenn., Ordinance No. BL2017-739, § 11.34.020 (introduced June 6, 2017 and
withdrawn July
6,
2017),
https://wvv.nashville.gov/mc/ordinances/term_2015_2019/
b12017_739.htm; see also Cari Wade Gervin, Lecislators Vow Battle over Metro Ordinance, NASHVILLE
POST (June 22, 2017), https://w.nashvillepost.com/politics/metro-government/article/
20865568/legislators-vow-batde-over-metro-ordinance.
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required 39 and prohibited law enforcement from inquiring into an
40
individual's imnigration status.
Like most sanctuary policies, the underlying premise of the ordinance was
to encourage "cooperation of immigrant residents, and trust between
communities and public agencies, [which] is critical to fulfilling the mission
and duties of the city; and trust between the immigrant community and local
law enforcement [which] is critical to promoting public safety for our entire
city."41

The Nashville city ordinance did not pass. 42 Former Tennessee
Republican Congresswoman Diane Black critiqued the ordinance stating
that "[i] t's time for [Nashville] Mayor Barry to stop borrowing liberal policies
from California and New York and start putting the safety and security of
43
Tennessee families first."
Diane Black's response highlights the politically polarized manner in
which sanctuary policies are evaluated and considered. There is no inquiry
into whether states and localities are properly exercising their Tenth
Amendment police powers or whether states and localities are usurping
federal authority in regulating immigrants within its borders.
Another city in Tennessee, Knoxville, has a county and a city
government. 44 The city and county governments are diametrically opposed
in relation to sub-federal immigration regulation. In 2017, approximately

39

Nashville, Tenn., Ordinance No. BL2017-739, § 11.34.020 (introduced June 6, 2017 and
withdrawn July 6, 2017).

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Jonquil Rose Newland, Sanctuagy Ci(y-LIae Ordinance Advanced by Metro Council, NEWS CHANNEL 5
NASHVILLE June 20, 2017, 10:36 PM), https://www.newschannel5.com/news/sanctuaiy-citylike-ordinance-passed-by-metro-council (last updatedJune 21, 2017, 5:45 AM).
SeeJoey Garrison, Mayors Remain Source ofStrengthfor Tennessee Democrats,TENNESSEAN (July 22, 2016,

44

11:59 AM), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2016/07/22/mayors-remainsource-strength-tennessee-democrats/87135326/ (last updated July 24, 2016, 7:25 AM)("As the
state has reddened politically, mayors of Nashville, Memphis, Chattanooga and Knoxville all
Democrats have become the strength of the party and a bench as its looks for viable candidates
for governor and U.S. Senate. In recent years, party leaders have routinely pointed to the crop of
mayors as the centerpiece of a strategy for Democrats to make a comeback."); see also Michael
Collins, Tennessee Politics: State Increasingly Split Along Urban-Rural Lines, TENNESSEAN (Nov. 4, 2016,
6:02 AM), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2016/l1/04/tennessee-politicsstate-increasingly-split-along-urban-rural-lines/93232774/ (last updated Nov. 4, 2016, 11:06 AM);
Tyler Whetstone, Five Things Learnedfrom Knox County Election, KNOX NEWS (Nov. 7, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/11/07/five-things-learnedknox-county-election/1910687002/ (last updated Nov. 7, 2018, 11:59 AM) (confirming that the
Republican party in 2018 still maintains control over Knox County and stating that "[i]n this year's
election, as in other recent electoral contests, the political views of Tennesseans are shaped not just
by party and ideology but also by geography"); Zachsearcy, A Heat Map oflKnox County's 2016Election
Results by Precinct, REDIrr KNOXVILLE (Nov. 11,2016, 9:55 PM), https://wvw.reddit.com/r/
Knoxville/comments/5ciilw/a heat map of..knox countys_2016_election-results/ (confirming
Republican county and Democrat city).
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187,347 people resided in the City of Knoxville and 461,860 in the
surrounding Knox County.45 In 2013, the Knox County Sheriff vowed he
"will continue to enforce these federal immigration violations with or without
the help of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). If need be,
I will stack these violators like cordwood in the Knox County Jail until the
' 46
appropriate federal agency responds.
The Knox County Sheriffs rhetoric mirrors polarizing statements across
the country. The rhetoric is often based in fear. Americans are told that
immigrants are taking their jobs, using up tax money, raising crime rates,
and are an affront to cultural norms. 47 The Knox County Sheriffs
comments exemplify a common phenomenon when it comes to the debate
on immigration reform: the objectification of immigrants. The Knox
County Sheriffs comments led to the 2017 implementation of Knox County
and federal government cooperation in the apprehension and detention of
immigrants-called 28 7 (g) programs. 48 Knox County is the only local
government in the State of Tennessee with this type of enforcement
agreement.
Knox County's policies conflict with the Mayor of the City of Knoxville
who declared: "While we are not a sanctuary city we are and will remain a
welcoming city-welcoming city to people of all races, ages, genders,
ethnicities, nationalities and religions."' 49

45

QuickFacts: Knoxville City, Tennessee, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2017), https://vw.census.gov/

46

quickflcts/knoxvillecitvtennessee; QiockFacts:Knox County, Tennessee, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1,
2017), https://xAw.census.gov/quickfacts/knoxcountytennessee.
Hedy Weinberg, ACLU Warns Knox County SheriffActing upon His Statements Would Violate Law, ACLU

47
48

49

TENN. (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.aclu-tn.org/aclu-wans-knox-county-sheriff-acting-uponstatements-violate-law/.
Ted Brader, Nicholas A. Valentino, & Elizabeth Suhay, What Trggers Public Opposition to Immigration?
Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat, 52 AM.J. POL. SC. 959, 959 (2008).
See Michael Crowe, Knox Co. SheriffApprovedJbr ICE Partnership;Only Agency in 'I, WBIR.COM (June
29, 2017, 8:46 PM), https://wvw.wbir.com/article/news/local/knox-co-sheriff-approved-for-icepartnership-only-agency-in-tn/51-453026435 (confirming Knox County Sheriff entering into
287(g) agreement program with federal government in 2017 and stating that 'Jones [Knox County
Sherill] drew criticism in 2013, after the first application was denied, for saying he would 'stack
these violators like cordwood in the Knox County Jail until the appropriate fedeal agency
respond'"); Tyler Whetstone, IimsigrantRighti Group to Deliver Hndreds ofLetters Against ICE Partnership,
KNox NEWS (Apr. 4, 2019, 9:37 PM), https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/politics/2019/
04/04/immigrant-rights-group-deiver-lundreds-etters-opposing-287-g-ice-knox-county-sheriff/
3345402002/ (last updated Apr. 5, 2019, 3:03 PM) (stating "Former Knox County SheriffJimmy
'JJ.'Jones signed the two-year 287(g) agreement inJune 2017").
Tyler Whetstone, Knoxville Mayor. Keep Hearts Open to Immigrants, KNOX NEWS (Jan. 31, 2017, 8:47
PM), https://www.knoxnews.com/sto-y/news/local/20 17/01/31/kioxvife-mayor-keep-heartsopen-immigrants/97290414/ (last updatedJan. 31, 2017, 9:47 PM).
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Knoxville's mayor reiterated the police department's longstanding policy
to not inquire into a person's immigration status. 50 Like many police
departments across the country, not inquiring into a person's immigration
status promotes people "feel[ing] comfortable calling the police department
if they need help."51
In the other large metropolitan area in Tennessee, Memphis, the mayor
made an informal declaration that the City would be welcoming to
immigrants. 52 In support of this declaration, the spokesperson for the
Memphis Police stated that the police would have little interaction with ICE
54
agents. 53 Memphis ultimately did not pass a sanctuary ordinance.
Even though no sanctuary laws were passed in cities and municipalities
throughout the State of Tennessee, in 2017 the majority Republican state
legislature proposed and enacted an anti-sanctuary jurisdiction law. 55 The
law was in response to the proposed Nashville city ordinance. The legislature
believed that Nashville's proposed ordinance exposed how a local
56
government could circumvent Tennessee's 2009 anti-sanctuary law.
"Proponents of the measure, including state Sen. Mark Green-the bill's
sponsor-and [former] U.S. Rep. Diane Black, who is seeking the GOP
nomination for governor, also tried to pressure the governor. They argued
the legislation is necessary in order to ensure there are no sanctuary cities in
Tennessee."57
In May 2018, Tennessee Governor Bill Haslam allowed the antisanctuary law bill to become law without his signature. 58 The law went into
effect on January 1, 2019.59 The main provision of the law prohibits state
and local governmental entities and officials from adopting sanctuary
policies. If a city or local government adopts a sanctuary policy, the local
entity is ineligible for state funding until the policy is repealed. 60 The law
50

Id.

5'
52

Id.
Ryan Poe, What Tennessee's New Sanctua

53

2018, 11:14 AM), https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/govei-nment/county/2018/
05/21/what-tennessees-new-sanctuary-cities-ban-means-shelby-county/628741002/ (last updated
May 21, 2018, 5:57 PM).
Id
Id.
H.B. 2315, 110th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2018) (enacted).
Joel Elbert, Coy. Bill Haslam to Allow Measure Bannig Sanctuay Cities, OrderingICE Compliaweto Become Law

54
55
56

57
58
59

60

Cities Ban Means to Shelby Couny, COM. APPEAL (May 21,

Pt'ithout Stnature, TENNESSEAN (May 21, 2018, 10:23 AM, https://www.tennessean.com/stoo,/
news/politics/2018/05/21 /gov-bill-haslam-allow-measure-banning-sanctua-y-cities-ordering-icecompliance-become-law-without-si/565769002/ (last updated May 21, 2018, 2:37 PM).
Id
Id.
Daniel Connolly, A Tennessee Imm grationLaw Goes into Effect Ja. I and Coud Change Shelby County Poliy,
COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Dec. 27, 2018, 6:00 AM, https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/
news/2018/12/27/tennessse-sanctuary-city-bill-shelby-county/234289 1002/.
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-42-101 104 (2019).
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also requires all law enforcement officers to inquire into a person's
immigration status and punishes local governments if their law enforcement
agencies adopt, formally or informally, policies or practices that limit
entanglement with federal immigration enforcement. 6 1 It permits law
enforcement agencies to enter into 28 7 (g) memorandums of agreement with
62
federal officials concerning enforcement of federal immigration laws.
Tennessee's anti-sanctuary law requires the state courts to evaluate
violations of the law, which may require state courts to engage in an analysis
of immigration law. 63 The law requires courts to assess and interpret
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 64 Specifically, when
courts assess violations of the law, the courts run the risk of beginning to
interpret whether an individual is lawfully present in the United States. Ai
individual's immigration status is a complex area of immigration law for
which Congress created a comprehensive administrative immigration
system. 65
The pattern in Tennessee follows a similar trend across the United States.
The trend has been for urban cities or Democrat dominated legislatures to
pass sanctuary laws while rural areas and Republican dominated legislatures
are passing exclusionary immigration laws. 66 Certainly, the intrastate
dynamics between the sanctuary friendly cities and the immigrant adverse
state legislature in Tennessee demonstrate this exact phenomenon.

61

§ 4-4.2-102.

62

§ 7-68-105.

63

§ 4-42-104.

64

Id

65

"The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ... rivals the tax code in the level of detail,
confusion, and absurd consequences produced by years of layering on provisions without
systematically reviewing their results."
AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, COMPREHENSIVE
IMMIGRATION REFORM: A PRIMER 1 (2009), https:// \w.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/

66

research/comprehensive-immigration-retbrm-primer; see also US. Immigration Law: The B Picture,
NOLO,
http://vvwA,.nolo.com/lega-encyclopedia/us-immig-ation-law-the-big-picture
(last
visited Mar. 1, 2019) (attesting that immigration law is "[w]idely considered more complex than
the tax code").
See Tim Henderson, Cities, States Resist-and Assist Immration Crackdown in New Ways, PEW (Aug.
3, 2018), https://vww.pewtrusts.org/en/reseach-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/08/03/
cities-states-resist-and-assist-immigration-crackdown-in-new-ways.
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III. COURT BATTLES AND IMPLICATIONS OF CONTINUED SUB-FEDERAL
REGULATION

The sub-federal battle has generated federal litigation across the
country. 67
The litigation has been between states and localitieshighlighting the red state and blue city divide. 68 This divide has increased
with the Trump Administration's immigration policies and the January 25,
69
2017 Executive Order attempting to defund sanctuary states and cities.

On January 25, 2017, President Donald Trump issued an Executive
Order addressing immigration enforcement issues, including the use of state
and local law enforcement. 70 The Executive Order acknowledged the need
to "cooperate fully with States and local law enforcement in enacting
Federal-State partnerships to enforce Federal immigration priorities, as well
as State monitoring and detention programs that are consistent with Federal
7
law and do not undermine Federal immigration priorities." '
In addition, on May 22, 2017, the Attorney General issued a memo

stating that sanctuary jurisdictions who willfilly refuse to comply with
of the INA are not eligible to receive federal grants
Section 1373
administered by the Department ofJustice or the Department of Homeland
Security. 72 Section 1373 requires cooperation between the Department of
Homeland Security and state and local entities. It specifically provides that
federal, state, or local governments cannot restrict access to an individual's
73
immigration status.

67

See, e.g., United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (seeking an injunction

68
69
70

to prevent the application of certain of California's sanctuary city policies as preempted by federal
immigration law); California ex reL Becerra v. Sessions, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(denying motion for preliminary injunction); City & Cry. of San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp.
3d 924 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (challenging the Trump Administration's anti-sanctuary city policies and
alleging that the Administration is exercising unconstitutionally excessive power over immigration
policy.).
Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017).
See cases cited infra note 74.
See, e.g.,
City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018); Texas v. Travis Cty., 910 F.3d

71

809 (5th Cir. 2018).
Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, at § (e) fJan. 25, 2017).

72

73

Memorandum from Jefferson Sessions, Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't ofJustice, on Implementation of
Executive Order 13768 (May 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/968146/
download.
8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a
Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any
government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or
unlawful, of any individual."). Section 1373 has subsequently been held to be unconstitutional by
.ANew York v.Departmenl of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) and Ciy & County of San
Franciscov.Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
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In response to the Trump Administration, inJanuary 2019, at least 120
communities enacted sanctuary policies which limit assistance in the
enforcement of federal immigration law and twenty-eight states have at least
one jurisdiction that enacted a sanctuary policy in the last two years. 74 The
Trump Administration has not been successful in state and local litigation
challenging the Administration's memo attempting to defund sanctuary
states, cities, and localities. 75 The United States District Courts in California,
Chicago, and Philadelphia have ruled against the Administration's Executive
Order.76

74
75

76

The Success of Sanctuay Under Trump, IMMItGRANT LEc,\i, RESOURCE CFR. (Jan. 21, 2019),
https://www.ilrc.oig/success-sanctuary-under-trump.
Id. On March 29, 2017, the City of Seattle commenced a lawsuit challenging President Trump's
Executive Order 13768. City of Seatle v. Trump, No. 17-497-RAJ, 2017 WL 4700144 (W.D.
Wash. Oct. 19, 2017). The Executive Order denies federal funding to cities found to be in violation
of 8 U.S.C. § 1373. A city found to be in violation is labeled a "sanctuary city." The City requested
that the court designate Seattle as in compliance with Section 1373 and further sought a declaration
from the court that the law was in violation of the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause.
In April, a nationwide preliminary injunction was instituted against the Executive Order. On
October 30, the parties filed a joint motion to stay proceedings until the resolution of County of
Santa Clara v. Trump in the Ninth Circuit, and this motion was granted on October 31, 2017.
In Ciy of14Test Palm Beach v. Sessions, No. 9:18-CV-80131 I-DIM (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2018), the
Department ofJustice threatened to withhold federal Byrne JAG funding from the City of West
Palm Beach (similar to the City of Philadelphia case) for ostensibly failing to comply with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1373. The federal government claimed that West Palm may be out of compliance and requested
additional documentation; however, the City countered that they were in compliance with the
original requirements and the additional DOJ-inposed requirements violated the Spending Clause.
Further, the City argued that it was in compliance with federal law and was not a sanctuary city.
The parties entered into mediation and it was decided that the city was in compliance with federal
law. City officials were encouraged in a memo to share any and all requested information, including
citizenship and immigration status, with federal authorities and the city will retain its ByrneJAG
federal funding.
The case was closed on March 29, 2018. The settlement agreement,
unfortunately, is not publicly available.
In City of Richmond v. Truntp, No. 17-CV-01535-NN7HO, 2017 WL 3605216, (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21,
2017), the City of Richmond in California brought suit against the federal government challenging
President Trump's Executive Order 13768 regarding immigration funding and the threat to
withhold it from "sanctuary jurisdictions." The City argued that the order was unconstitutional
because it violated the Separation of Powers and Spending Clauses and also violated the Tenth
Amendment by forcing cities to choose between losing federal funding and upholding their own
laws. The deftndants replied that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated any concrete harm because
no action had been initiated against the City of Richmond. Judge Orrick, who is cunently handing
a number of related cases, invited Richmond to file an amicus brief in the Santa Clara/San
Francisco litigation. The city chose to do so and this case was dismissed on August 21, 2017. If the
city is targeted in the future, it could bring a case at that time.
In i0 & County of San Franciscov. Trump, No. 4:17-CV-00485-DMR, 2017 WL 412999 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 31, 2017) and Counly qfSanta Clara v. Tntp, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017), the
district court held that President Trump's executive order was unconstitutional and on April 25,
2018, issued a nationwide injunction enjoining defendants from enforcing section 9(a) of the
executive order. The case is ongoing. In a 2-1 decision, the Court of Appeals held that the District
Court properly granted summary judgment to the counties because the Executive Order violated
Separation of Powers. City & Cry. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1245 (9th Cir. 2018).
However, the court held that the nationwide injunction was overly broad and limited it to
California. Id. The court remanded to the district court. Id.
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In City of Philadelphia v. Trump, Philadelphia challenged the Attorney
General's memo. The City of Philadelphia received ByrneJustice Assistance
Grants ('JAG") Program funding which would be defunded under the
Attorney General's memo. 77 Even though the city of Philadelphia is not
officially a sanctuaryjurisdiction, the City developed policies to establish trust
with immigrant communities to encourage the reporting of crimes. 78 In
2017, the Department ofJustice added additional criteria for receipt of Byrne
funding in an attempt to defund sanctuary jurisdictions. Specifically, the
Department of'Justice provided that in order to receive Byrne funding a city
had to: (1) allow federal immigration agents to access the city's detention
facilities; (2) provide the Department of Homeland Security at least fortyeight hours advance notice of when an immigrant would be released from
the city's custody; and (3) certify that the city is in compliance with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1373. 79
The City of Philadelphia argued that the new conditions placed on the
Byrne funding "commandeer[ed] City officials into the enforcement of
federal immigration law in violation of the Tenth Amendment." 80 The City
sought, and the district court granted, declaratory and injunctive relief.8 1
Significantly, the District Court found that Philadelphia's policies were
adopted in good faith to protect individual civil rights.8 2 The Third Circuit
stated: "[t]he City assumes great risk if it violates individuals' civil fights,
which would, inter alia, subject the City to endless litigation and very
expensive damage claims for violating civil rights of prisoners." 83 Thus, the
court also held that even if the funding conditions were valid, Philadelphia
84
was in compliance or substantial compliance with the conditions.
In addition to the Administration's attempt to defund states and localities,
the intrastate battles have also spurred a barrage of lawsuits. Tennessee
enacted its law after a federal district court in City ofEl Cenizo v. Texas upheld
Texas's 2017 anti-sanctuary law.8 5 Texas's anti-sanctuary law similarly
permitted local law enforcement officers to question the immigration status
of people they detain or arrest. 86 Texas, like Tennessee, is another red state,

77
78

City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
Id. at 297.

79
80

City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579, 595 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
Id. at 591.

81
82

309 F. Supp. 3d at 344 45.
Id.

83
84

Id. at 316.
Id.

835
86

890 F.3d 164, 173 (5th Cir. 2018).
Henderson, supra note 18.
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blue city jurisdiction where multiple cities-Houston, 8 7 Austin, 88 and
Dallas89 - proposed and enforced sanctuary laws, resolutions, and policies.
In Ciy of El Cenizo v. Texas, cities and localities filed a lawsuit challenging
the State's law.90 The Texas law prohibited local authorities from limiting
their cooperation with federal immigration enforcement, and required local
officers to comply with ICE detainer requests for immigrants in custody. 91
The complaint alleged multiple constitutional violations including that the
92
Texas law was preempted by federal immigration law.
The Texas law also banned state and local entities from prohibiting or
preventing local entities from inquiring into the immigration status of
lawfully detained individuals. 93 The law, like the Tennessee law, established
a system whereby the Texas Attorney General enforces the law through the
creation of a complaint structure whereby private citizens could file
complaints alleging violations of the law. 94 Upon determining that such a
complaint is valid, the Attorney General may file suit in state court to enforce

87

Harris County in which Houston is located the Harris Count), Sheriffs Office confirms it does not

88

require its employees to ask the residency of anyone detained or atrested. SeeJuliAn Aguilar, Travis
Counoy Sherijf Announces jVew 'Sancluary" Polio,,TEX. TRIB. Jan. 20, 2017, 5:00 PM),
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/01/20/tiravis-counity-sherilt-announces-new-sanctuai -poli/
("A Friday announcement by newly-elected Travis County Sheriff Sally Hernandez that her office
would reduce cooperation with federal immigration authorities ....");Melissa Correa, Sancluaiy
7
Sities:
Can You Find 7 in in Texas?, KHOU II (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.khou.com/article/
news/sanctuary-cities-can-you-find-the
in-texas/285-ca 1811 12-a32e-40cf-a 15b-2dbb9670a25f
("The Houston Police Department confirms it's complying with SB-4, giving officers discretion to
ask a person's legal status. The Harris County Sherilfs Office confirms it does not require its
employees to ask the residency of anyone detained or arrested."); Edwin Rios, The First B Fght
Over Sanctuag Cities Pits a Latina Shesiff Against Texas' Covermor, MOTHERJONES Jan. 27, 2017),
https:/ /www. motheijones.com/politics/2017/01 /texas-greg-abbott-austin-sanctuary-cityimmigration/.
Austin, Tex., Resolution 20180614-073 (June 14, 2018); John Barned-Smith & Lomi Kriel,

89

Sanctusa Cities Bill Ire of Local Law Enforce rent, Civil RighLs Advocates, CHRON (May 5, 2017, 11:59
AM), https:/ /www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/artice/Sanctuary-cities-bi-d-awsire-of-local-law-I I122854.php ("Travis County Sheriff Sally Hernandez, who announced that she
would stop cooperating with most U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement requests to hold
immigrants while federal authorities investigate their status.").
Memorandum from City Manager T.C. Broadnax to Mayor and Members of Dallas City Council

90

(Sept.
21,
2018),
https://dallascityhall.com/goveniment/citymanager/Documents/FY 1718%20Memos/Welcoining-Plan-Recommendations-and-ResolutiionMeno
092118.pdl,
Stephen Young, Dallas Counly Passes Resolution Supporting Undocumented Residents, DALL. OBSERVER
(Feb. 8, 2017, 7:25 AM), https://wwwv.dallasobserver.com/news/dallas-couty-passes-resolutionsupporting-undocumented-residents-9164779; Brandi Grissom & Dianne Solis, Abbott Targets
Sanctuary
Cities,
Dallas
Sheriffs
New
Policy,
DALL.
NEWS
(Oct.
26,
2015),
https://www.dallasnews. com/news/local-politics/20 15/10/26/abbott-targets-sanctuary-citiesdallas-sherilfs-new-policy.
890 F.3d at 173.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93
94

Id. at 174.
Id at 175 (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE§ 752.055(a) (2017)).
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the law. 95 State and local officials' violations of the law would result in their
96
removal from office.
The Texas law was the subject of an appeal to the Fifth Circuit. In the
case, the Circuit Court examined whether the INA preempted Texas antisanctuary law. The Fifth Circuit's preemption analysis evaluated both field
and conflict preemption doctrines and relied upon the Supreme Court's
federal preemption cases Arizona v. United States97 and De Canas v. Bica.98 The
court held that Congress had not manifested a clear and manifest purpose to
oust state power to regulate immigration. 99 Accordingly, there was no field
preemption l 00o The court found that while the INA regulates how local
entities cooperate in immigration enforcement, the Texas law only specified
whether state and local governments can cooperate. The court also held that
there was no conflict between the INA and the Texas law. 10 1
In addition, the court found that no conffict preemption existed between
the Texas law and immigration laws. 102 The court relied upon principles
articulated in Arizona v. United States' 03 and Chamberof Commerce of United States
v. 1hiting,1°4 where the Supreme Court articulated that it is not the courts'
job to engage in a "'freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute
is in tension with federal objectives' because 'such an endeavor would
undercut the principle that it is Congress rather than the courts that preempts
105
state law."''
This case demonstrates an overall trend of federal courts construing state
regulation of immigration broadly. The broad construction permits states to
cooperate with the federal government in the enforcement of immigration
laws. City of El Cenizo also demonstrates that when a state legislates
cooperation there is little room for local governments, cities, and counties to
carve out their own sanctuary policies.

95
96

Id. (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE § 752.0565(b) (2017)).
Id. (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE § 752.0565(c)).

97
98

Id. at 176 (citing Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012)).
Id. (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976)).

99
Id (citing De Canas, 424 U.S. at 357).
100 Id at 177- 78 (first citing Arizona, 567 U.S. at 400 02 (defining the relevant field as "alien

101
102

registration"); and then citing De Canas, 424 U.S. at 360 n.8 ("Every Act of Congress occupies some
field, but we must know the boundaries of that field before we can say that it has precluded a state
from the exercise of any power reserved to it by the Constitution.")).
City ofEl Cenizo, 890 F.3d at 178.
Id. at 178 ("Conflict preemption occurs when "compliance with both federal and state regulations

103

is a physical impossibility... or when a state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted)).
Id. at 179 80 (citing Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399, 411 15).

104

Ciy of El Cenizo, 890 F.3d at 179-80 (citing Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S.

105

582, 607 (2011)).
Id. at 180 (quoting Whiting, 563 U.S. at 607).
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Even after the Texas ruling, in June 2018, the City of Austin passed a
Freedom City initiative-intended to be different from sanctuary policies but
addressing similar issues. 106 The three components of the policy are: "(1) To
direct the Austin Police Department in ending 'unnecessary arrests;"' "(2) To
make sure the immigrant community members are aware of all their rights;"
and "(3) To mend the trust/relationships between community members and
law enforcement." 107
Resolution 73 charges the City of Austin to reduce racial disparities in arrests
and eliminate the low-level arrests that the Austin Police Department doesn't
have to make in the first place. Arrests for low-level charges contribute to
racial disparities in the Travis CountyJail. Under SB 4, they are also a ticket
to detention and deportation.
Resolution 74 directs the City of Austin to create policies that create
protections for immigrant community members and their constitutional

rights under SB 4, including requiring that police officers who ask about
immigration status also inform people of their right to not answer. It also
requires officers to complete a report explaining the encounter and the
circumstances leading them to ask for immigration status. 108
The resolution is crafted very broadly. It also addressed overall policing
misconduct that operates at the intersection of race, class, and immigration
status.
On February 27, 2019, the Albuquerque Bernalillo County Commission
passed a non-discrimination resolution, similar to the city of Austin's
policy. 109 The Albuquerque resolution not only limits the information that
can be shared with the Department of Homeland Security, it also broadly
protects the following:
[S]ocial security number or individual tax identification number or lack of
such numbers, an inmate's custody release date, a person's place and date of
birth, a person's status as a recipient of public assistance or as a crime victim,
a person's home or work address, a person's employment information, a
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person's sexual orientation, gender identity, physical or mental disability,
religion, or national origin. I10
The goal of the policy is to "create new ways for city officials to comply
legally with federal rules and state laws, while still protecting undocumented
immigrants."''
So far there are no legal challenges to the Austin Freedom
City Resolution. Other cities-Madison, Wisconsin; Portland, Oregon; Ann
Arbor, Michigan; Albany, California; and Silver City, New Mexico-have
passed similar resolutions and ordinances." 12 The issue will be whether the
broad exercise of localities' powers to regulate individuals within their
jurisdictions will prevent challenges to the immigration parts of the Austin
Freedom City-like resolutions.
CONCLUSION
The intrastate battles demonstrate how diverse political geographies
create varied immigration policies within one state. More specifically the
political battle lines have often been drawn between Republican states and
Democrat cities within those states. Within this battle, Republican states are
promoting the Trump Administration's restrictive immigration policies while
cities attempt to protect immigrants within their communities.' 13 Early
immigration federalism scholarship focused on the contours of whether state
or local action was preempted and which body (local, state, or federal) was
the appropriate entity to regulate immigration. The legal landscape has
changed to a politically charged one in which the influence of interest groups
promoting ideological stances cannot be discounted. With this change,
scholars must pay attention to how the red state and blue city political
landscape influences the contour of immigration federalism.
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